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Beyond East-West: Marginality and National Dignity in Finnish 
Identity Construction 
 
‘Mindscapes of Marginality’ 
 
Since the end of the Cold War it has become common for Finnish academics and 
politicians alike to frame debates about Finnish national identity in terms of locating 
Finland somewhere along a continuum between East and West (e.g., Harle and Moisio 
2000). Indeed, for politicians properly locating oneself (and therefore Finland) along this 
continuum has often been seen as central to the winning and losing of elections. For 
example, the 1994 referendum on EU membership was largely interpreted precisely as an 
opportunity to relocate Finland further to the West (Jakobson 1998, 111; Arter 1995). 
Indeed, the tendency to depict Finnish history in terms of a series of ‘westernising’ 
moves has been notable, but has also betrayed some of the politicised elements of this 
view (Browning 2002). However, this framing of Finnish national identity discourse is 
not only sometimes politicised, but arguably is also too simplified and results in blindness 
towards other identity narratives that have also been important through Finnish history, 
and that are also evident (but rarely recognised) today as well. In this article we aim to 
highlight one of these that we argue has played a key role in locating Finland in the world 
and in formulating notions of what Finland is about, what historical role and mission it 
has been understood as destined to play, and what futures for the nation have been 
conceptualised as possible and as providing a source of subjectivity and national dignity. 
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 The focus of this article is therefore on the relationship between Finnish nationalism and 
ideas of ‘marginality’ through Finnish history. Being marginal is usually understood in 
one of two connected ways. On the one hand, it is equated with being either on, near, at 
or beyond the edge of the core spaces of political life. On the other hand, it is understood 
as entailing limited power and subjectivity. In this article, however, we contend, first, that 
marginality is not only about one’s ‘position’ in relation to different power centres, but is 
also about ‘identity’. Second, we highlight that narrating identity in terms of marginality 
can also be a rhetorical strategy of empowerment, though this has taken significantly 
different forms throughout Finnish history. In short, therefore, this article demonstrates 
how, since the nineteenth century, differing narratives of marginality have played 
important roles in Finnish national identity construction. Whilst marginality has 
sometimes been seen as something to be escaped in favour of centrality, sometimes it has 
been viewed more positively in terms of ‘splendid isolation’, or as expanding the idea of 
the West and Europe. The principal claim we make, however, is that what marginality is 
understood to relate to is changing. Traditionally marginality in Finland has been 
perceived either culturally (in terms of youthfulness) or geopolitically, with marginality 
concerned with Finland’s position in the European balance of power and its relationship 
to and between the great powers. Today, however, marginality is being detached from 
conceptions of geopolitics and culture, and in Finland is increasingly narrated in terms of 
globalisation, with marginality increasingly conceptualised as a temporal/teleological 
issue, rather than a geopolitical or cultural one.  
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A word of caution regarding the claims of this article is, however, necessary. Whilst we 
contend our focus on marginality and the particular reading of history we draw from this 
is important, we are not attempting to provide a new hegemonic reading of Finnish 
history to replace that currently in vogue through East-West conceptualisations of Finnish 
identity and history. Rather the aim is an emancipatory one, to show on the one hand that 
other readings are also possible, and on the other hand to add complexity to current 
debates by illustrating that to a considerable degree various historically specific 
narratives locating Finland at different points along the East-West continuum have also 
been heavily informed by (and sometimes even premised on) narratives of marginality. 
What we do suggest, however, is that in the current situation analysts who continue to 
locate Finland solely in East-West terms are missing the fact that discourses related to 
marginality are becoming ever more important and precisely at a time when East-West 
frames make less sense. 
 
This general absence of any sustained reflection on the role of ideas of marginality in the 
construction of Finnish identity is notable for at least two reasons. First, it is notable 
because outsiders have frequently characterised Finland as a marginal space par 
excellence. At different times Finland has been depicted as a borderland or frontier, a 
somewhat messy place existing on the edge of Europe and between the great powers. 
However, Finland’s marginality has also been depicted in terms of its ‘Northernness’ and 
cold climate, whilst the Finns’ presumed racial difference from the Caucasian ‘norm’ has 
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encouraged racial and ethnographic expeditions and contributed to the Finns’ 
‘exoticisation’ (and subordination) in the discourses of outsiders.1  
 
More significantly, however, this absence is notable because arguably notions of 
marginality have been imbued in narratives of Finnish nationalism from the beginning. 
To some extent this has been recognised in the broader literature of nationalism studies 
where Finnish nationalism is variously categorised as an example of eastern/ethnic 
nationalism (Roshwald 2001, 5), separatist nationalism (Breuilly 1985), peripheral 
nationalism (Hechter 2000, 15-17) or, according to Hroch’s (1985) definition, might be 
seen as representing the movement of a ‘non-dominant ethnic group’. Whilst such 
categorisations are often too simplified and fixed (e.g., as Roshwald (2001, 221) notes, 
after the First World War the ‘ethnic’ national movements of Eastern Europe also 
developed notable ‘civic’/western aspects, whilst Finland is also an excellent example of 
such an ethnic/civic mix) what these various categorisations do capture is the extent to 
which the Finnish national discourse (and that of other national movements) has from its 
beginning conceptualised the Finns as a nation emerging from the periphery, as a nation 
subordinate, subjugated and lacking power, and that to some degree has always had to 
fight or petition to be heard or recognised as an equal member of the family of nations. 
Importantly, though, although such categorisations have implicitly recognised the 
marginality at the heart of the Finnish national movement there has not been any further 
serious consideration of what influence such marginal positions may entail for the 
                                                 
1 E.g. see the travelogue of Wendy Hall (1953). The Finns’ borderland location in the discourses of 
outsiders can also be seen in Cold War references that often depicted Finland as ‘Scandinavia with a 
difference’ (e.g. Connery 1966: 445). 
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development of such national movements, or more particularly what kinds of discursive 
practices such marginality may produce.  
 
Our contention is that the need to convince and assure oneself of one’s right to exist as a 
nation and a state is central to all the above mentioned typologies of nationalism. 
Peripheral nationalism, for example, represents the challenge of a (territorial) margin to a 
political centre which at a certain point becomes transformed into an open demand for 
separation. Similarly, Hroch’s focus on the ‘non-dominant ethnic group’ expresses 
another dimension of the need to convince onself of and assert a nation’s self-esteem. In 
this case the national movement is presented as representing a majority population that 
has so far lacked socio-political or cultural power, which instead is held by a minority 
elite part of the population. In the Finnish case this refers to the dominance of Swedish 
speakers such that Swedish culture and language were comprehended exclusively as 
representing socio-political power, whilst Finnish was regarded as a peasant-language. 
Convincing and persuading Finnish speakers of their right to nationhood and assuring 
them of their capacity to be a true nation therefore became central to national rhetoric. To 
reiterate, therefore, the point is that Finland is a case where the national movement has, 
from its origins, been related to questions of exclusion and subordination, of fighting 
from the margins for a right of existence and national subjectivity. Even if the times of 
internal struggle have now passed, this concern with gaining recognition and position has 
remained central in Finland’s external relations where a concern with being small, 
peripheral and marginal has always underlain broader narratives about Finland’s place in 
Europe and its position along the East-West continuum. 
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 This notion that the search for self esteem, subjectivity and acceptance has particular 
resonance for national movements that have been imbued with notions of marginality 
from their beginning also resonates with Greenfeld’s (1995, 491) argument that “National 
identity is, fundamentally, a matter of dignity”. For Greenfeld nationalism is frequently 
driven by the vanity of the community which is always trying to legitimise its position, 
protect what has been achieved, or trying to move towards a new enhanced position. This 
search for national dignity is arguably more prescient for smaller and ‘younger’ nations 
with a history of emerging from subordination, like the Finns, than for larger and more 
established nations with histories more of domination, like the English, who to some 
degree can take their existence, recognition and national dignity more for granted. From 
our perspective this raises the question of whether national dignity can ever be achieved 
through a positively narrated understanding and framework of marginality, or whether 
frames of marginality will rather promote actions to escape them. Ultimately we would 
argue that narratives of subordination and exclusion are unlikely to provide for national 
dignity if accepted unchallenged. Marginality cannot in national discourse just be 
recognised and accepted as a permanent lack of power, but rather needs to be resolved 
with a view that national dignity can be achieved. However, whether national dignity 
requires escaping marginality, or whether it can be achieved through embracing it is 
something we explore below. 
 
A few more words about marginality are therefore in order. In traditional modernist 
discourses margins and peripheries are usually taken as given, being understood as 
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basically fixed entities largely subordinated to more powerful centres, or seen as being 
somehow self-defined by their backwardness or exclusion from the cultural core. 
However, margins are not objective facts but social constructions. As indicated above, in 
the discourses of outsiders, the power of naming and signifying is central to the 
construction and creation of margins (whilst the naming of the marginal is also central to 
the construction of the core) (see Shields 1991: 5). Furthermore, whilst the power to 
ascribe is usually seen to rest with the core, with the core often seen as imposing its 
definitions on others, this is not always the case. Sometimes entities may freely ascribe an 
identity of marginality to themselves. At other times, however, they may actively seek to 
frame the labels applied to them by others in new ways. Thus, instead of seeing 
marginality as a bind or a negative label depriving them of subjectivity and power, 
marginality may also be re-conceptualised as a resource and site of action (see Browning 
and Joenniemi 2004). Similarly, it is also not unusual for ‘margins’ to define themselves 
as places of innovation (Ardener 1987: 45-6), or for outsiders to view them as sites of 
experimentation.2
 
In this respect, and to some extent ignoring the discourses of outsiders, our focus is on 
how dominant narratives of Finnish national identity have related the nation to ideas of 
marginality and how in telling marginality in different ways at different times different 
orientations and ways of relating to world politics have become meaningful. Ultimately, 
this relies on a ‘performative’ understanding of the nature of language in that, following 
Butler (1997, 17-18), we argue that language is not only constitutive of the world (as 
                                                 
2 This has been the case for northern Europe in the post-Cold War period, which the EU, US and Russia 
have spoken of in terms of being a laboratory for experimenting with new forms of governance and 
building new relationships (see Browning 2003). 
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constructivists argue) but also that our representations of identity promote certain kinds 
of conduct rather than others. Or put otherwise, different readings of marginality, or 
relating Finland to marginality in different ways (e.g., whether it is to be embraced or 
escaped), will have a fundamental impact on the nation’s vision of itself, of where it is 
going and which orientations it is likely to consider in its national foreign policy (also see 
Ringmar 1996). 
 
More particularly, to capture this narrative framework we introduce the notion of 
‘mindscapes of marginality’ to refer to how particular discourses of marginality within 
national identity narratives are not just descriptive of the current position, but also always 
prescriptive of how things ought to be. The notion of a ‘mindscape of marginality’ also 
highlights that all narratives exist in a wider discursive field constituted by other 
narratives. In the Finnish case, for example, narratives locating Finland somewhere along 
the continuum between East and West have been particularly important, though other 
salient narratives have, for example, focused on Finland as a small state or its relations to 
Sweden and Swedishness. Similarly, the notion of mindscape also helps illustrate that 
identity markers (such as of marginality) are always embedded in a web of other concepts 
(Wæver 2002: 31; Shields 1991: 22). Thus, in the Finnish case marginality often needs to 
be understood in regard to other concepts such as: North, East, West, Baltic, Europe, 
civilisation, smallness, borderland, frontier etc… Methodologically this is important since 
this web of concepts means it is possible to identify a marginality narrative even if the 
concept itself is not being used in a particular period or instance, but instead can be 
inferred from the way other related concepts are being deployed. 
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 In the following, therefore, we aim to map the mindscape of marginality in Finnish 
identity narratives, with the notion of the mindscape pointing to the interconnectedness of 
different concepts and narratives, whilst the concept also conjures to mind a mental 
geography and spatiality. As Liulevicius (2000, 151) indicates, once a mindscape has 
been constructed it provides a mental map, a way of looking at things and one’s 
environment, whilst it also becomes prescriptive of how to move through the mindscape. 
A mindscape points to what is to be taken as ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ in a spatial and 
temporal sense and is thus a guide to the future that frames how to read the current 




From Cultural to Geopolitical Marginality: The Imperial, Inter-War and Cold War 
Periods 
 
As noted, it has become popular to argue that the key dynamic in Finnish national 
identity debates has been one of quite where Finland should locate itself along a spectrum 
between East and West. Our contention is that whilst this captures much of current 
debates it has also meant other important dimensions have been neglected. In particular, 
in our view the East-West frame has also been fundamentally about issues of how 
Finland relates itself to marginality, and to some extent a mindscape of marginality has 
underpinned much of the East-West debates of the post-Cold War period.  
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 In the following, therefore, we provide a revisionist interpretation of identity politics in 
Finland, one that emphasises mindscapes of marginality over other issues. Because of 
space our ability to comprehensively demonstrate the case is limited. Consequently, 
although we provide an overview of marginality narratives from the 1800s onwards, the 
major focus is on the post-Cold War period where we argue a rather intriguing shift in the 
foundations of the mindscape of marginality can be identified. 
 
Imperial Margin 
Prior to gaining independence in 1917 it is important to realise that Finnish nationalist 
discourse adopted a generally positive attitude towards notions of marginality such that 
emphasising marginality even became constituted as central to the achievement of 
national dignity, subjectivity and even national existence. Before the First World War the 
spheres of imagining marginality were primarily cultural and racial, not geopolitical, and 
were also initially directed in terms of overcoming the dominance of Swedish speakers 
and Swedish culture in Finland. Central elements to the national movement were 
therefore such things as the promotion of a Finnish literary heritage and culture and the 
Fennicisation of the bureaucracy and universities. Drawing on Herderian ideas it was felt 
that nationhood required inventing a national culture that would pave the way to the 
future. Folk poems and ethnography became the foundations of developing this national 
consciousness and building a distinctive Kulturnation (see Wilson 1976). In particular, 
this contributed to the idealization of the common folk and their harsh life at the margins 
of subsistence, with the poor and simple being associated with purity and authenticity, 
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and with this turning marginality into a virtue. A myth of a stubborn nation never giving 
in even in the face of great difficulties was constructed (Klinge 1993: 232-3) and became 
central themes employed by core nationalist writers like Aleksis Kivi (1991/1870) and 
Juhani Aho (1995). As Smith (2003, 27-40) argues, ‘cults of authenticity’ like this often 
constitute the centre of nationalist belief-systems and point to what is considered true and 
genuine in a society at a particular time. Notably, cults of authenticity often refer to 
something simple, rude and unaffected or even primitive that is close to the common 
people. However, in the Finnish case this search for authenticity also has certain unique 
features, not least through the emphasis on poverty and the harsh climate as sources of 
the Finnish soul.   
 
The embracing of marginality was also evident in the Finns’ attitudes towards the racial 
theories of the day that tended to categorise the Finnic peoples as Mongols and thus 
something non-European, uncivilized and even half-witted (see Kemiläinen 1998). 
Whilst the Finns fought against the negative characterisations of these theories, racial 
marginality was also embraced since it provided another pillar for differentiating the 
Finns from their neighbours (particularly the Swedes) and for gaining acceptance as a 
distinct ‘nation’. Indeed, ‘racial purity’ was also seen as central to the success of Finnish 
athletes at the Olympics starting from the Stockholm games of 1912. This success was 
not seen as the result of better training, but as a racial issue. The Finns, it was asserted, 
had not been degenerated by civilization as ‘old’ Europeans had been, but retained their 
vitality (Lehti 2000). 
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The emphasis on cultural and racial elements was also evident in that the Finns 
overwhelmingly imagined their future within the Russian empire, rather than as an 
independent nation-state. Nonetheless, after being annexed from Sweden in 1809 Finland 
was granted a special administrative system that left the Finns with their own senate and 
a unique institutional mechanism enabling the presentation of Finnish affairs directly to 
the Tsar. The Grand Duchy also had its own legal system and bureaucracy and by the late 
nineteenth century even its own currency and customs border with the Empire. 
Administrative developments after 1809 therefore brought Finland close to the imperial 
centre, whilst simultaneously guaranteeing its uniqueness. In the nineteenth century 
political struggle with regard to Russia thus concentrated mainly on preserving and 
developing this system, whilst warding off deeper integration in the Empire. At the same 
time, key figures in the national movement like Snellman and Yrjö-Koskinen made clear 
that as a ‘small’ nation national dignity would be best achieved through adapting to 
Imperial preferences and focusing on the cultural sphere, rather than through political 
struggle for independence, which to them seemed highly unrealistic.  Following Hegelian 
logic the Finns were depicted as an emerging nation, and the creation of the Grand Duchy 
of Finland following Finland’s annexation from Sweden by Russia in 1809 was seen as a 
reflection of the Finns’ development towards adulthood (Koskinen 1869). 
 
However, the institution of unification policies, known also as russification, throughout 
the Empire at the end of the nineteenth century, which aimed at harmonising the 
Empire’s administrative practices and homogenising the Imperial space, and which 
therefore challenged the Finns’ emphasis on their marginal and distinct position within 
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the Empire, resulted in confrontation with the Imperial capital. Finnish reactions took 
three forms. At the extreme there was a small level of support for an ‘activist’ resistance 
against the Tsar, with the Activists’ ultimate aim being separation and independence. The 
major political division, however, was between the ‘Constitutionalists’, who adopted a 
policy of passive resistance and who asserted Finland’s sovereignty was enshrined in 
legal agreements, and the more conservative ‘Old Finns’ who adopted a submissive 
policy. In their view the best option for small and marginal entities like Finland was 
simply to ride out the storm, demonstrate continued loyalty to the Emperor and wait for 
better times (Huxley 1990). Importantly, though, membership of the Empire still 
dominated visions of the future (even for the Constitutionalists) and separation was an 
alternative only conceivable to a small minority, at least until the final chaotic years of 
World War I. 
 
Aside from escaping from subjugation under Swedish cultural and linguistic dominance 
and locating the nation on the fringes of the Russian Empire, frames of marginality were 
also central in how the Finns positioned themselves in regard to western civilisation. 
Accepting of their position in the Empire major forums for expressing national dignity 
became cultural and sporting occasions such as World Exhibitions (Smeds 1996) and 
sporting events like the Olympic Games (Paasivirta 1963), as opposed to political venues. 
In these contexts a positive emphasis on marginality as a way to emphasise Finnish 
uniqueness, subjectivity and national dignity took several forms. On the one hand, it was 
expressed in terms of an emphasis on naturalistic notions of the Finns as a nation 
emerging from the wilderness and even in terms of a certain orientalisation of Finnish 
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culture. This was evident, for example, in the construction of the Finnish pavilion for the 
Paris Exhibition of 1900. As Griffiths (1993: 93) describes it:  
 
The Finnish pavilion was made of huge blocks of stone, castellated windows at 
ground level and a steeply pitched roof. The roof line was broken by a series of 
short flag poles and the whole surmounted by a huge tower which had more than 
faint suggestions of the Middle East, blended with art nouveau touches. The door to 
the pavilion was guarded not by classic figures of antiquity but by the bears and 
squirrels that expressed Finnishness through the country’s fauna.  
 
Rather than playing down marginality and copying the mainstream styles of the core, 
Finland’s marginality and difference was notably exaggerated in this context. Indeed, the 
landscape of forests and lakes became an embodiment of the nation, and thus ‘the 
wilderness’, but also the cold climate and Finland’s northernness, was similarly used to 
assert the uniqueness of Finnishness in relation to nations with a long history of 
‘civilization’ (Mikkeli 2000; Valenius 2004, 90-98).  
 
On the other hand, marginality was also expressed positively in terms of vitality and 
youthfulness. Being ‘young’ in comparison to old established European nations became a 
dominating notion in the construction of Finnish national identity. Thus, although the 
Finns were often presented (by themselves as well as by others) as marginal, they also 
introduced themselves as ‘nations of the dawn’ to whom the next century would belong. 
This metaphor was clearly seen, for example, in emerging feelings of pan-Finnishness 
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that called for establishing the unity of all Finno-Ugrians under Finnish leadership and 
declared how the next century would belong to them (Wilson 1976: 138-9). 
 
In sum, the mindscape of marginality in the pre-First World War era was constructed 
through a series of dichotomies. These included those of: youth versus maturity, future 
versus past, vitality versus decadence, nature and wilderness versus culture and 
civilisation. Finland according to the Finns belonged to the first of each category. 
Finnishness was thus constituted through marginality, with such a position being 
understood as necessary to guarantee the nation’s uniqueness and for guiding the Finns 
into the future. Rhetorically, therefore, marginality was thus embraced, with Finland seen 
as emerging from the margins (wilderness) to claim its place in the family of nations. The 
margin here, understood in cultural and naturalistic terms, was a refuge and shaper of the 
Finnish national character.  
 
Vanguard state 
In the interwar period a mindscape of marginality remained important in framing Finnish 
orientations and self-understandings, however, the mindscape shifted from a cultural 
frame of reference to an increasingly geopolitical one, and where ‘size’ also became an 
ever more salient consideration. At the same time this reframing of the marginality 
mindscape also became intertwined with discourses related to Finland’s position in East-
West relations.  
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The impact of World War I was central to the shift towards geopolitical thinking, and 
also prompted new ways of thinking about national sovereignty that now prioritised 
independence over autonomy within Russia, with 1917 marking not just the end of 
imperial Russia, but also of its dominance for framing the future. ‘Smallness’ was the 
overwhelming feeling in the midst of the ongoing political chaos, with smallness 
overwhelmingly understood in terms of vulnerability and precariousness. Such feelings 
were not surprising given that this was a period in European politics where the future was 
seen to lie with big states and when concepts like that of Lebensraum were being used 
(Cohen 1964, 41). Interestingly, in Finland this saw the popularisation of ideas of a 
forthcoming Greater Finland and this remained a dream of the right through to the end of 
the Second World War. The result, however, was that in interwar Finland the notion of 
smallness and certain defiance in the face of this were interestingly mixed. 
 
After World War I ‘Baltic’ became a central label for locating a number of the Russian 
successor states within Europe and the idea of a Baltic League gained support, especially 
in Estonia and Latvia, but also in Finland, as a defence against the ‘problem’ of 
smallness. Interestingly, in Finland terms like the ‘border states’ or ‘diagonal zone’ were 
used to describe the belt of new states on the Russian border – including Finland – with 
this position at times being given a positive value (Lehti 1999, 219-227). Thus, as V.M.J. 
Viljanen (1920, 31-3) put it:  
 
They [the border-states] belong to the same central diagonal zone in Europe as we 
do and they possess some of the richest lands in Europe, eminently suitable for 
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economic development. On account of their key position and a population that 
comprises altogether about 85 million souls, they will, sooner or later, come to have 
an important political and economic significance in Europe.3  
 
Such concepts located Finland as a country on the edge, at the frontier, or in the margins 
between core spaces of European politics. Echoes of earlier bluster that bragged of 
raising the margin to become a new centre were also clearly written into this vision of 
‘new Europe’. 
 
In particular, the eastern border came to dominate Finnish national imagination and was 
depicted not only as a state border, but as a border separating different cultures and 
political systems and that even stood as the dividing line between Europe and Asia. In 
this respect, Finland was described as a ‘vanguard state’ and seen as an outpost of the 
West standing alone against the East (Immonen 1987) and where the margin was 
understood, at one and the same time, as a site of danger – the fear being that Finland 
would be submerged “in the great ocean of Slavic nations” (Hannula 1939: 20) – and as 
constitutive of a national purpose and mission for the newly independent nation: a 
mission to stand guard against the East. Such imagery was best captured in a popular 
poem by Unto Kailas called, ‘On the Boundary’. 
 
The border opens like a crack. 
In front of us is Asia, the East. 
                                                 
3 Importantly, though, not all in Finland shared this sense of solidarity with the border states and rather 
chose to exclude Finland from this group in favour of emphasising connections to Scandinavia (Lehti 1999, 
227-238). 
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Behind us is the West and Europe; 
I will guard it as a sentry… 
(quoted in Paasi 1996: 171) 
 
Thus, whilst East-West narratives were clearly central in debates about Finnish identity, 
the notion of marginality and its implications for Finland also played a key constitutive 
role in just how this East-West frame played out. In other words, the nature of Finland’s 
Westernness was fundamentally shaped by the mindscape of marginality operating at the 
time.  
 
New heroic historical narratives were introduced to strengthen the national mission and, 
as indicated, the Finns were presented as a kind of Soldier Nation with a great heritage of 
military exploits to be found since pre-historical time (Meinander 1999: 122-5). 
Capturing the era’s overarching mentality, the marginal activist resistance movement of 
the early 20th century was now praised in popular historical movies as an example of 
national heroism and resistance (Laine 1999). However, imagining Finnish heroic 
adventures was not limited to the past but was extended into the future too. Thus, in 
Finnish novels Petrograd was frequently conquered and ravaged because it was built on 
Finnish soil (Peuranen 1995, 7). Finland, therefore, was depicted as western in contrast to 
an often lustful East. The division between East and West, Russia and Finland was also 
openly racist. “Russophobic” narratives depicting Russians as evil, treacherous and 
sexually perverse dominated, while the Finns instead were seen to represent purity, 
honesty and loyalty (Karemaa 1998; Laine 1999, 249-304). As noted, marginality, here, 
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was presented as a matter of honour in standing alone against the East, against 
communism and Asia. In this respect, Finland’s position on the margin, and the mission 
this was seen to give Finland to defend the West against the Bolshevik Slavic East, was 
also ironically a mission that utilised marginality to grant Finland a central role in the 
East-West struggle. Notably such representations were to come to dramatic fruition in the 
Finnish-Soviet Winter War of 1939-1940, in which small Finland was popularly 
characterised in Finland (and abroad) in terms of David standing up to the evil Soviet 
Goliath. 
 
In all, following World War I marginality was transformed from a preoccupation with 
cultural and racial backwardness and distinctiveness to concerns with Finland’s 
geopolitical location and size as a newly independent small state in a Europe largely 
defined by the great powers. Demonising Russia, and the feeling of living on the edge of 
the Western world as a vanguard state, were dominating narratives. Finns were depicted 
as brace northern barbarians who would get by with more civilized European nations on 
their own terms. Marginality and peripherality here were hidden behind heroic narratives 
that looked to the past as a way to project the national mission into the future and that 
also proclaimed the Finns as playing a role central to the defence of Western civilisation. 
The narrative still had utopian elements, in particular in the 1920s, but generally the tone 
was rather defensive – to concentrate on securing what had been achieved. Trusting in 




Whereas inter-war national narratives had constructed Finland’s marginality in terms of 
being the border guard of the West – thereby emphasising marginality to grant Finland a 
central role in the defence of the West – throughout the Cold War dominant narratives 
emphasised Finland’s peripherality in order to locate the country outside of the East-West 
conflict. However, despite the different reading marginality continued to be viewed 
positively and when linked to concepts such as ‘Nordic’ it represented the possibility to 
escape from the Cold War conflict altogether. Moreover, this position on the edge, in 
what was sometimes called Europe’s ‘quiet corner’, also became a position from which 
Finland might act and carve out a niche for itself in the international politics of the Cold 
War.  
 
Central to this shift was a reappraisal led by President Paasikivi (1946-56) following the 
end of World War II that sought to account for why inter-war foreign policy had failed to 
prevent the outbreak of war with the Soviet Union in 1939. Paasikivi argued that 
Russophobic characterisations of the Soviet Union/Russia as the Finns’ hereditary enemy 
represented a misreading of Soviet/Russian intentions. Rather than being an inherently 
aggressive and evil hegemon, Paasikivi (1956: 35-6) argued Moscow’s territorial 
interests in Finland at the end of the 1930s were not ideological and expansionist, but 
legitimate, strategic and defensive in nature. Paasikivi demanded a thorough expunging 
of negative attitudes, protestations and symbols of the Eastern neighbour. This became 
manifest, for example, in the ‘cleansing’ of negative references to the Soviet Union from 
school textbooks and the removal of books containing ‘hostile’ representations of the 
Soviet Union from public libraries (Salokangas 1996: 117; Hadjú and Paasi 1995: 43).  
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 Similarly, revisionist histories provided a more positive take on Finnish-Russian relations 
and in doing so provided a roadmap for future positive relations. Thus, inter-war 
characterisations that presented Finnish-Russian relations as dogged by innumerable wars 
and open hostility, gave way to new histories emphasising a different historical continuity 
of peaceful coexistence (Korhonen 1969: 33). A certain return to the late 19th century 
reading of Finnish-Russian relations was noticeable that emphasised the importance of 
the separation from Sweden as the beginning of a Finnish state guaranteed by the Tsar. 
However, it also clearly interpreted Finnish-Russian relations as those between sovereign 
equals, even if sharing the same ruler. This reading of the Finns’ unique position in 
Russia appealed to post-Cold War readings of Finnish-Soviet relations of being close 
friends, but simultaneously separate entities. Further, the war and the defeat against the 
Soviet Union also called for acceptable interpretation to preserve a sense of national 
dignity. A myth of victorious defeat in which Finland’s sovereignty was won was thus 
created,4 and which was linked with the idea of Finland as a piece of driftwood caught in 
the maelstrom of European great power politics and that therefore had little choice in its 
actions (Jokisipilä 2005). This determinism was premised on a very negative reading of 
Finland as small state in a realpolitik world and where smallness was equated with a 
distinct lack of subjectivity. This was then taken to characterize future options available 
                                                 
4 Particularly notable was the idea that instead of losing the war Finland had come a creditable second, for 
the reason that ultimately independence had been preserved, whilst other than London and Moscow, 
Helsinki was the only European capital city (of those states at war) that had not been occupied. This notion 
of coming second can, for example, be seen in Väinö Linna’s novel Tuntematon sotilas (The Unknown 
Soldier - 1954). This novel was not only a best seller that was adapted to film, but was also a key text in 
explaining the nature of the war to the Finns, as well as in encouraging reconciliation between the left and 
right of society. 
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to Finland and was also used to elicit sympathy for its position and policy on the 
international stage. As Paasikivi put it: 
 
The voice of small states isn’t heard in the present concert of big powers. Only big 
powers play a decisive role at the world stage. The tasks and impact of big powers 
is due to the circumstances different than those of small states who in realizing the 
proportions must understand the necessity of reservedness (quoted in Tiilikainen 
2006: 75). 
 
As a small state subject to the whim of others’ actions the best Finland could hope for 
was to keep its head down and be left alone. Indeed, being small, here, was seen as a 
question of survival, of the life and death of the nation. Ultimately, this securitisation of 
Finland’s size was to have negative effects for Finnish democracy as foreign policy 
issues became the preserve of the President and put beyond public debate, whilst under 
president Kekkonen (1956-81) the domain of foreign policy was also extended such that 
the people were seen to have responsibility not to challenge the official line or more 
particularly to put Finnish-Soviet relations in jeopardy through ‘irresponsible’ critiques of 
the Eastern neighbour (Arter 1998). 
 
In this context, ‘neutrality’ constituted a core term that was seen as essential for securing 
state sovereignty and to which all other issues were subordinate (Alasuutari and Ruuska 
1999: 89). Therefore, ‘neutrality’ also constituted a major rhetorical turn to achieve 
national dignity as a small power acknowledging the dominance of big powers. Finland’s 
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neutrality policy also resonated with the Snellmanian view of the nineteenth century, and 
explicitly drew on that Fennoman heritage, that Finland should be prepared to adapt itself 
to Soviet preferences and even anticipate their wishes. More broadly, though, Finland’s 
neutrality policy was understood as a way to isolate the country from the Cold War, to 
keep out of the international limelight and to send a message to the Soviet Union that 
they had no reason to worry about Finland. At the same time, emphasising Finland’s 
smallness became a way to gain understanding, to locate Finland in the margins of the 
Cold War by presenting Finland as harmless, and thereby to keep the great powers at a 
distance. 
 
This embracing of a position of marginality in relation to the Cold War conflict was also 
promoted by emphasising the nation’s Nordic identity throughout the period. 
Emphasising Nordicity achieved at least three aims. First, presenting Finland as a Nordic 
country (rather than a Western outpost as in the interwar period) was a way to express 
“Finland’s psychological bonds with the Western world” without unduly provoking the 
Soviet Union (Nousiainen 1963: 189). Second, a Nordic orientation discursively 
differentiated Finland from the precarious region of Eastern Europe and the Baltic 
republics, and placed Finland in the category of the stable and accepted Nordic group of 
sovereign states (Kettunen 2001: 234; Wæver 1992: 79). Third, this self-proclaimed 
position on the northern/Nordic margins also became understood as a position from 
which to speak and gain subjectivity – and thereby to even begin to escape passivity in 
international affairs for a more activist stance. In this respect, the idea that the Nordic 
countries could be peace builders and mediators in East-West issues (but also between 
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the global north and south) was widely promoted, with President Kekkonen even 
proclaiming to the UN in 1961 that Finland saw itself as a physician trying to cure the 
problems of world politics (Kekkonen 1970: 94).  
 
The notion of being Nordic also became associated with the evolving Nordic way of life 
built around the welfare state and concepts of egalitarianism and progressiveness. From 
the 1960s onwards Finland experienced a remarkably swift process of modernisation and 
urbanisation, such that by the 1980s it was common for Finnish school children to hear 
that being born in Finland was like winning the lottery of life. Such rapid developments 
went some way to usurping images of Finland as a poor and backward country, even if 
popular culture continued to romanticise the agrarian way of life. The state, however, 
became depicted as at the forefront of ultra-modern states.5 In the ideological conflict of 
the Cold War the prosperous Nordic welfare states with their strong emphasis on social 
justice were seen to have found a middle way through the ideological divide (Hanhimäki 
1997: xii). In turn this perception became a further support for bridge building and 
activism in foreign policy, as well as for providing grounds for a narrative supporting 
national dignity. 
 
In the Cold War period, therefore, the identification of Finland as a state in the margins 
was rather overt. When linked to concepts such as the Nordic being marginal was seen to 
represent the possibility to escape from the Cold War conflict. At the same time, 
however, being in the margin, being somehow ‘between’ and being small, also became 
                                                 
5 On Finnish modernisation see Meinander (1999: 358-62); Alasuutari and Ruuska (1999: 85). About 
popular culture see Salmi and Kallioniemi (2000).  
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understood as resources providing grounds for Finland to gain subjectivity and an 
international role premised on bridge building. Thus, the discourse on ‘neutrality’ became 




From Geopolitics to Globalisation: The Post-Cold-War Era  
 
In the post-Cold War period marginality has been both embraced and seen as something 
perilous, whilst marginality in the 1990s also remained explicitly tied to a broader East-
West framework. However, if the ‘westernising’ geopolitical narrative of marginality 
dominated in the 1990s it seems a change has begun to occur in the early 21st century. 
Indeed, it seems the East–West framework has lost its omnipresent position and has been 
replaced by globalisation and the power of markets as key markers in the national 
discourse considered central to achieving national dignity in the future. In turn this has 
transformed marginality into something non-territorial and rather focused on questions of 
ability.  
 
Geopolitics in the 1990s 
The end of the Cold War became a catalyst for strong ‘Westernising’ narratives in 
Finland, whilst the experience of being located on the civilisational border between 
Byzantine and Roman Europes also became surprisingly conscious (Ruokanen and 
Nurmio 1995: 70; see also ‘A Northern Dimension’ video). On the one hand, dominant 
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narratives in the 1990s depicted marginality negatively, as something to be rejected and 
escaped. Here Finland was to be re-located to the Western side of the East-West 
boundary (as in inter-war narratives) rather than being a border zone, as in the Cold War. 
On the other hand, however, marginality has also been depicted as a resource that can be 
utilised precisely to relocate Finland at the geopolitical centre. In other words, playing on 
marginality was central in rejecting it in the 1990s. 
 
The Soviet Union’s demise was experienced with some confusion in Finland, since it also 
meant losing a safe and stable position in the margins. A simultaneous economic 
depression strengthened feelings that the country was a piece of driftwood in the flows of 
history. Whereas previously the Finns had escaped into a shell of ‘neutrality’, imagining 
Finland as a safe-haven in the great power conflict, of limited interest to others and 
unwilling to intervene in others’ business, now a new ‘return to Europe’ narrative located 
Finland differently and forced it to open up towards Europe.  
 
This ‘Westernising’ narrative argued that Finland should return home to its Western 
heritage, which it had been denied throughout the Cold War (Browning 2002). This has 
entailed a fundamental revision that reads Finland’s Cold War position between East and 
West as artificial and as the forced estrangement from its natural Western location. 
Historiographical and rhetorical naturalisations of Finland’s Westernness and 
Europeanness therefore became common in the 1990s, with the country’s history 
frequently presented as a journey from the periphery of Europe to its centre (Lehtonen 
1999: 5). Racial/linguistic theories also returned to prove the Finns’ Western origins 
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(Wiik 2002: 341-342), rather than emphasising Eastern influences and origins as in the 
Cold War. In this respect, the revisionist interpretation of history has asserted that 
neutrality and Finland’s Cold War position ‘between East and West’ were not questions 
of Finnish identity, but of Finnish pragmatism, with this being as far West as the Finns 
could get.  
 
In this context, marginality has often been read negatively in regard to the Cold War, 
being understood as the absence or forced denial of the ‘real’ ‘Western’ self. The West 
and Europe were presented as ‘normal’ and the ‘return to Europe’ a ‘return to normality’ 
from the abnormality of the past. This mindscape located Finland as no longer stuck on 
the periphery, but as moving from the periphery and the East towards the European and 
Western centre. Whereas previously emphasising a position on the margins was seen to 
emphasise one’s difference, thereby contributing to national identity construction and 
state sovereignty, the Westernising discourses saw difference from the Western core as 
problematic and as something to be overcome in favour of conformity and 
standardisation. These discourses, therefore, promoted moves towards EU membership in 
Finland (1995).  
 
Past experiences remained central to structuring this narrative and for providing a guide 
for the future. The experience of being a victim of Soviet aggression in World War II, 
and largely without foreign aid, was surprisingly strong. The danger of again being left 
outside in the ‘grey zone’ was a powerful idea in Finland. During the 1994 Finnish 
referendum campaign on EU membership Simopekka Nortamo, the editor of Helsingin 
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Sanomat, Finland’s dominant daily newspaper, described staying outside the EU as 
leaving Finland stuck “between chaos and stable conditions, between poverty and wealth, 
between democratic and undemocratic regimes”, and proclaimed a no vote would 
enhance the perception that Finland is an ‘Eastern country’ (cited in Kuisma 2003: 209-
10). According to Helsingin Sanomat Finland was previously a ‘retarded’ peripheral and 
inward looking country (Alasuutari and Ruuska 1999: 102). Thus, what was previously 
seen as splendid isolation and a source of pride of being ahead of ‘old’ Europeans was 
now regarded as something shameful and marginal and which through ‘Westernization’ 
could be escaped.  
 
Indeed, in this respect membership of the ‘Western’ EU was not enough. Instead, central 
to dominant discourses in the 1990s was the view that Finland not only needs to be a 
member, but needs to be a ‘core’ member at the forefront of all integration efforts. A key 
voice here was Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen who has held a firm belief that Finland 
needs to be at the EU core in all areas in order to avoid the big states making decisions 
over the Finns’ heads. Lipponen’s view is interesting in that it indicates a continued 
concern with Finland being a small and marginal state, where smallness and marginality 
can be overcome by becoming fully integrated in (indeed, at the forefront of) the 
European project.6 Thus, whereas previously integration was comprehended as 
threatening, it was now re-conceptualised as necessary for national survival – although in 
this context the discourse has been less about state security, with sovereignty increasingly 
                                                 
6 Notably, Erkki Tuomioja, Finland’s Foreign Minister and longer term rival of Lipponen in the SDP, has 
criticized people like Lipponen precisely for being stuck in a ‘Tilsit syndrome’, with this referring to the 
agreement between Napoleon and the Tsar to divide Europe into different spheres. 
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being seen more in terms of national culture (Joenniemi 2002: Alasuutari and Ruuska 
1999: 105). 
 
Finally, the Westernising narratives, and their relationship to marginality, can only be 
fully understood if put in the context of the Finns’ more immediate concerns of how to 
deal with a weakening, unpredictable Russia. Implicit here has been a negative othering 
of Russia as a threat to Finland, with the threat presented civilisationally, in terms of the 
chaos and social degeneration seen to lie across the Eastern border (e.g. Pihjala 1999, 
Moisio and Harle 2002). Thus, Finland’s position as the West’s border with Russia 
became understood as potentially threatening and as a source of vulnerability. 
Interestingly, though, such discourses of the Russian threat have also been central to an 
attempt to utilise Finland’s position on the edge to enhance its escape from the margin to 
the core.  
 
Central here has been Finland’s Northern Dimension (ND) initiative, a policy proposal 
launched in 1997 aimed at making EU policies towards the North and North West Russia, 
in particular, more coherent. In essence the ND’s successful marketing rested on 
convincing core EU members that with Finland’s membership of the EU northern 
problems, and more particularly security concerns regarding Finnish-Russian relations, 
were also of central importance for the EU as a whole. The initiative has consciously 
played on ideas of Finland as located in the Northern margins, but in a way that defines 
the Finns as innovators and pioneers in the new regional cooperation and that enables the 
Finns to play a constitutive role in Europe-making by making Finland useful for the EU 
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as the key manager of the EU-Russian border in the North (Joenniemi 2003: 234-7). 
However, instead of the existence of a common North, the North is depicted as divided 
between the wealthy, modern, hi-tech and industrious West encompassing the Nordic and 
Baltic States, and the backward, undeveloped, primitive spaces in the East. As such the 
narrative justifies a role for Finland in advising and providing patronage to aid the 
development of the East (Lehti 2002, 350-353).7  
 
In this respect, the ND is an expression of the dominant Westernising discourse. The ND 
re-inscribes the idea of a civilisational border even in the process of aiming to overcome 
it. This border is not one of radical othering, but is to be controlled. As such the policy is 
one that utilises Finland’s border position to its advantage by reasserting the importance 
of Finland to the EU (the centre). In some sense the policy can be seen as one designed to 
depict Finland as a part of the centre in the North, whilst simultaneously pointing to the 
significance of the northern margin for Brussels. 
 
From Geopolitics to Economics 
With EU membership, however, asserting one’s Westernness has become less salient. If 
‘returning to the West’ was understood as a ‘return to normality’, having achieved the 
goal it has now lost some of its importance, whilst it is no longer clear what constitutes 
‘normality’ and being ‘Western’ in this context. It has therefore become necessary to be 
more proactive in defining one’s standpoint on the global scene.  
 
                                                 
7 For such images see the 1999 video made by the Finnish Foreign Ministry on the ND 
http://virtual.finland.fi/finfo/english/northdim2.html  
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A repositioning of Finland that draws explicitly on a mindscape of marginality, but this 
time outside the East-West frame, has therefore become evident and can be highlighted 
through analysing two recent texts that have been influential in Finnish national debate. 
The first is the report, Roadmap to Finland’s Future Success, released in September 2004 
by the influential Finnish Business and Policy Forum (EVA) (Ruokanen 2004). Whereas 
previously the business elite has played only a limited role in national opinion formation, 
with this instead being the domain of the foreign policy elite and academics, following 
the dramatic geopolitical changes of the 1990s and the concomitant economic recession, 
the EVA report reflects a view that the old order and traditional assumptions for locating 
the nation no longer hold. The report therefore argues that dramatic changes are needed 
to save Finland from otherwise imminent degradation. Unlike previously (and not least in 
Westernising narratives) when ‘threats’ were seen as located in the past or present (i.e., 
returning to or escaping the past), in the EVA report threats are now located in the future 
with the emphasis rather on forgetting the past.  
 
In particular, the Roadmap contends that the fundamental framework for anchoring the 
nation has changed to become the world of globalized markets, which are seen as 
dominated by the determinism of market forces. Markets are conceptualised as fluid and 
therefore there is no fixed position guaranteeing success. Thus, whilst markets cannot be 
managed, the report argues that the nation needs to successfully adapt to the global 




The report is interesting not only in what is mentioned and emphasised, but also in what 
is not. Notably international politics goes unmentioned and is seen as unimportant for 
Finland’s success – only economic development is noticed. The assumption is that 
international politics cannot drastically influence market forces, which whilst understood 
as changeable are seemingly following timeless rules. Interestingly, the report also 
promotes a new attitude towards Russia based on the assumption that Finland’s 
geopolitical neighbourhood is no longer so constraining. In contrast to attempts to 
differentiate from Russia, Finland, it is argued, should become Russia’s spokesperson in 
the EU. Interestingly the report argues the Finns have been trapped with recent history 
and in particular the experiences of World War II. Instead, it emphasises the 19th century 
Grand Duchy as a time when Finnish–Russian relations were based on mutual 
understanding.8  
 
The report’s attitude towards marginality, or more precisely peripherality, is twofold. 
First, Finland is seen as characterised by its closeness to Russia, coldness and its out-of-
the-way location, but is simultaneously seen as a safe developed country. Despite the 
political rhetoric of the 1990s, it is now argued Finland no longer needs to ‘join the core’, 
but should try to become one of a select group of ‘vanguard states’ (but not in the terms 
of the interwar period) in the EU in all areas of development – i.e., a state that is out front 
and a leader, as opposed to finding safety in being just one amongst many (see also 
                                                 
8 Interestingly, an alternative and more positive interpretation of Finnish-Russian history has also been 
introduced, with the Finns’ membership of the Russian Empire now examined more openly than before. 
This has included St. Petersburg being depicted as an elemental city in Finnish history through which the 
Finns became part of Europe’s belle époque (Klinge 1997; Engman 2002; Lehti 2001). This narrative 
preserves the notion of Finland as a bridging space, whilst also problematising straightforward exclusions 
of Russia as the ‘other’ in the more dominant Westernising narratives. 
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Antola 2004). The alternative and worst scenario for Finland’s future is that it fails to 
adapt to the challenges of globalisation and rather becomes a peripheral and regressive 
backwater of Europe, a kind of nature reserve focused on environmental issues and eco-
tourism and with a population of ageing alcoholics. Second, however, marginality is no 
longer about geography and one’s location in relation to external issues, but is 
comprehended as an internal inability continuously to renew the nation to cope with 
global markets. To avoid such marginality Finland needs to become a ‘global top 
performer’ (Ruokanen 2004: 28). Marginality is thus comprehended as a non-territorial 
phenomenon that is linked to internal capacity and capability. 
 
Ultimately, the report sees Finland as an individual player in the global competition. 
However, despite the narrative’s rejection of the notion of peripheralisation the narrative 
can also be read as a return or reinvention of previous traditions of marginality that 
cherished Finland’s separateness and capability to stand alone – in this case in relation to 
the EU. This can also be seen, for example, in how Jorma Ollila, the CEO of Nokia, has 
stressed the importance of sisu in carving success out of global competition (Repo and 
Melander 2005). Sisu is a unique Finnish word referring to personal/national qualities of 
courage, guts, perseverance and determination and in this case easily connects with the 
heroic narratives associated with Finland’s lonely fight in the Winter War. 
 
Whilst not everyone agrees with the EVA report’s message and different possible future 
scenarios for Finland, based as they are on neo-liberal economic theories, the report 
nonetheless captures a growing tendency in society to look at Finland from a global 
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perspective, prioritising economics over politics and thus securitising socio-economic 
issues.9 In somewhat different ways, therefore, this can also be seen in the second text, an 
influential book by Manuel Castells and Pekka Himanen (2004: esp. 127-39), which 
explores why Finland has been so successful in embracing information technology 
without forsaking the welfare state.  
 
Whilst Castells and Himanen’s approach entails greater concern for social justice than the 
EVA report, and rejects unfettered neoliberalism, their argument is framed explicitly in 
terms of coping with globalisation and marginality narratives. In their view a central 
reason why Finland has successfully embraced globalisation and hi-technology derives 
from Finland’s history as a northern frontier, which they argue has therefore had the 
effect of making questions of survival particularly important for the Finns. The northern 
frontier, here, is understood as a cultural frontier, a political frontier, and not least as a 
climatic frontier. ‘Survival’ has therefore been a concern at different levels and might be 
said to have impacted on the psychological consciousness and national character (and 
culture) of the nation. The focus on survival, they argue, has meant that Finnish identity 
has been future-oriented, pragmatic, adaptable and embracing of new ideas and 
technologies (2004: 133). Being on the margins (of life/global politics) is understood as 
providing Finland with competence and resources that older, larger and more centrally 
located European countries lack. As they put it: 
 
                                                 
9 Kuisma (2003: 203-4, 219-24) similarly indicates how globalisation processes have become seen as 
inevitable (and desirable) amongst the Finnish political elite, with the consequent view being that “In order 
to survive it is necessary to adjust to the demands of globalisation” (2003: 204). He also notes there are 
similarities here with the ‘driftwood’ theory of the Cold War, but this time connected with economic rather 
than geopolitical imperatives (2003: 223-4). Also see Anttonen (2005: 117-8). 
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The Finns do not feel that their country has come of age, unlike other European 
countries with thousands of years of history. The information-society project suits a 
young country that is still partly in search of an identity. With little history to build 
on, the Finns are oriented to the future. For Finland, the ‘post-survival’ culture is 
something that is being created now; looking forward and not backward (2004: 
132). 
 
Again, and with some similarity to the geopolitical Westernising discourses of the 1990s, 
marginality is presented as a resource to escape marginality. Similarly, there are also 
close links with nineteenth century narratives that depicted the Finns as a young and 
virile nation, a nation of the future. However, whereas previous discourses primarily 
conceptualised marginality in spatial and geographic terms, this discourse on Finland as a 
youthful innovator rather locates marginality temporally/teleologically. In other words, 
Castells and Himanen implicitly point to a threefold division between backward societies 
lagging behind in terms of development, the core developed world able to adapt to 
technological innovation, if with some difficulty, and vanguard states (whether big or 
small) who not only embrace technological innovation but are its pioneers. The aim, 
therefore, is not to get to the core to find safety, but to move beyond the core. The aim is 
not to locate Finland in the core of Europe, but to conceptualise Finland in global terms 
with Finland establishing itself as a central hub and nodal point in a globalised world.  
 
As stated, though, whilst this is a discourse about leaving marginality behind once and for 
all, it remains premised precisely on a history of marginality. Finland can only escape 
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marginality and be a world leader because it was marginal, because Finland’s marginality 
put questions of survival at the centre of Finnish national identity and culture and made 
adaptability, pragmatism and innovativism core Finnish values. At one and the same time 
then marginality is both rejected and seen as providing the nation with valuable cultural 
resources. 
 
Despite their differences, therefore, Castells and Himanen agree with the EVA report in 
that it is not so much the existence of the state but national welfare that is threatened by 
globalisation. Preserving and increasing competitiveness has thus become viewed as a 
new vital national interest across much of the political spectrum. This globalised 
discourse has not broken the dominance of national rhetoric, but has resulted in national 
sovereignty being interpreted in a new way, and in this process the globalised story has 
become a new unifying narrative for the nation. Put otherwise, competitiveness is not 
considered a matter for individual companies, but is perceived (even by business elites 
such as at EVA) as a question for the whole nation. In this perspective the future is 
always uncertain and changeable and therefore the key to future success is adaptability 
and the capability to react even before change has taken place. In this narrative past 
national experiences have lost some of their meaning in defining contemporary national 
threats, with the source of national dignity now being seen to lie in Finland’s 







The aim of this article has been to show how mindscapes of marginality have been 
central to understanding identity debates in Finland, which in turn have played a key role 
in shaping the broader directions of Finland in the world. In doing so the aim has also 
been to challenge the current tendency to analyse Finnish identity debates simply through 
the lens of an East-West framework, in part by showing that this frame only begins to 
make sense once discursive structures of marginality are also taken into account. Thus, 
Finland’s ‘Westernness’ or ‘betweeness’, or policies of being a Western outpost or a 
neutral bridge-builder, have been provided with a particular flavour by deeper discursive 
structures of marginality. More particularly we have also argued that the existence of 
marginality mindscapes as a grounding frame for Finnish national debates ultimately has 
its origins in the birth of the national project, where ‘Finnishness’ was always seen as in 
the process of escaping from subordination and negation and of trying to achieve 
recognition and a sense of national dignity. 
 
Attempts to assert national dignity in the context of mindscapes of marginality, however, 
have occurred in two ways. On the one hand, marginality has been embraced, with the 
nation trying to escape to marginality. Thus, in the nineteenth century and in the Cold 
War emphasizing marginality became seen as providing a basis for subjectivity and as a 
move towards a site of security. The margin became conceptualized as a resource from 
which to take a positive stand, and became understood as something to be treasured and 
preserved. However, at other times, marginality has been associated with a position of 
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insecurity or of a lack of power and visibility. Thus, in the inter-war period and in the 
1990s the overwhelming aim was to escape from marginality, to replace marginality with 
centrality or, as in the current period, to even move beyond the centre to become a world 
leader, pioneer and innovator. However, even when the goal has been to escape 
marginality, marginality narratives have remained constitutive of the national discourse. 
First, this has been because the idea of a margin to be rejected has provided a conceptual 
direction and sense of movement for the nation in its attempt to attain national dignity. 
Second, though, often the claim to centrality or of being a vanguard state has 
paradoxically been supported by attributes derived precisely from a sense of marginality. 
Thus, in the inter-war period it was precisely Finland’s geopolitical location on the 
Western edge that was seen to provide it with a central role in the fight against the East, 
whilst in the current period it is the history of cultural, political and climatic marginality 
that is seen to underlie why Finns are pragmatic and able to grasp the technological 
mantle. In these instances, marginality (even if it is to be rejected) has been seen to 
characterize the Finns as young, active and virile, with Finland moving into the limelight 
by usurping the older, more conservative and lethargic traditional core. 
 
Finally, in telling this story the article has also illustrated that quite what ‘margin’ has 
meant in different mindscapes of marginality has varied significantly through time. For 
example, in the nineteenth century marginality was equated largely with cultural issues, 
whilst throughout much of the twentieth century it was linked primarily with ideas of 
geopolitics and spatial location. Today, however, these traditional mindscapes of 
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marginality are now being challenged by a new set of narratives that depict marginality 
more in terms of issues of economics and globalization. 
 
Dominating views on the mindscape of marginality have also contributed to different 
kinds of political actions in different periods. In the nineteenth century, the mindscape 
emphasised utilising marginality (northerness, the equation of poverty with purity) and in 
this process established visionary elements to be achieved in the distant future. Thus, 
politics towards the political centre in St. Petersburg was flexible and defensive and 
instead of looking actively for changes and reforms, policy could be characterised merely 
as determinist. The interwar reading of the mindscape of marginality mixed smallness 
and defiance and contributed to a belief in the Finns’ ability to stand alone against 
anyone. It also supported a belief in visionary goals like that of Greater Finland. 
Simultaneously, though, a certain modesty prevented the Finns from engaging in open 
challenge before it was necessary in 1939. The Cold War era saw a re-conceptualisation 
of marginality as a virtue and introduced it as a fixed position. Thus, preserving 
marginality by seeking cover under the shell of ‘neutrality’ became a dominating 
principle of foreign policy. In the post-Cold War era, visionary elements returned to the 
mindscape, receiving their expression in the goal to be one of the core states of the EU. 
However, in contrast to earlier periods, where change was perceived as a process of 
decades, now it was imagined in years and as potentially rather swift. Making the issue 
more complex, however, was that going to the centre was seen to require utilising 
Finland’s position on the civilisational border. The last turn represents a return to more 
determinist thinking, in which positions at the margin or in the centre are understood as 
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questions of internal capacity and which, in this case, are seen to provide Finland with a 
pragmatic ability to be flexible in foreign policy.  
 
Putting the argument in more general terms we would argue that marginality is a core 
element of national discourses in certain categories of nationalism and where coping with 
marginality becomes a central dynamic of national identity building. However, 
marginality is not a straight-jacket but may be a rather flexible phenomenon that can be 
transformed from a sign of weakness to a source of authenticity. Thus, even if 
marginality is always related to others constituted as the centre, and therefore has certain 
constraining structural elements about it, those understood as marginal can have 
considerable freedom over how marginality is interpreted and what being marginal is 
taken to mean and in this respect can be a notable source of subjectivity for nations 
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